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1 Introduction
Economists have long been interested in the relationship between competition and growth,
but economic theory seems to be contradicted by the evidence. Indeed, the most impor-
tant growth models in which there exists an imperfect competition (Romer (1990), Gross-
man and Helpman (1991) and Aghion and Howitt (1992)) show a decreasing or increasing
relationship between competition and growth. However, recent empirical work (Aghion
and Griffith (2005)) which disputes the form of this relationship, finds an inverted-U
relationship between competition and growth which is robust to many alternative specifi-
cations and remains true in the data for many individual industries. In order to reconcile
theory with evidence, Aghion and Griffith (2005) and Bucci (2005a) extend the basic
Schumpeterian endogenous growth model. The first one introduces an escape competi-
tion effect in the Aghion and Howitt (1992) model whereas the second one introduces an
resource allocation effect in the Romer (1990) model.
On the other hand, recent theoretical works (Ziesemer (1991), Eicher (1996), Redding
(1996), Arnold (1998), Blackburn, Hung, and Pozzolo (2000), Sjo¨gren (1998) and Lloyd-
Ellis and Roberts (2002)) analyze the relationship between R&D investment and human
capital accumulation and their impact on growth. However, all these studies don’t focus
on the effect of competition on growth. More recently, Bucci (2003) and Bucci (2005b)
focus explicitly on the relationship between competition and growth.
The purpose of this paper is to extend these works. Indeed, contrary to all these
models, first, by following Benassy (1998) and Bianco (2006), we introduce a distinction
between the returns to specialization and the market power parameter which allows us
to have a better measure of the competition. Indeed, in our model the market power
parameter is not strongly related to the returns to specialization but it is completely
independent. Secondly, we introduce the degree of R&D difficulty in the sense that higher
values of skilled labor force require more skilled labor allocated in the research sector to
achieve the same level of the growth rate of knowledge.
Our paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents our model. Section 3 analyses the
market equilibrium. Section 4 discuss the relationship between competition and growth
in a general case. Finally, section 5 concludes.
2 The model
The model developed is based on Bucci (2003)4 model in which we disentangle the returns
to specialization from the market power. The economy is structured by three sectors :
final good sector, intermediate goods sector and R&D sector.
2.1 The final good sector
In this sector atomistic producers engage in perfect competition. The final goods sector
produces a composite good Y by using all the jth type of intermediate goods xj and
skilled labor HY .
5 Production is given by :
Y = AH1−αY n
γ−1+α
∫ n
0
xαj dj, (1)
4We use the notations of Bucci (2003) in order to have a direct comparison with his model.
5Time subscripts are omitted whenever there is no risk of ambiguity.
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where α and γ ∈ ]0, 1[ and A are technological parameters. This production function
allows us to disentangle the degree of market power of monopolistic competitors in the
intermediate sector ( 1
α
) and the degree of returns from specialization (γ).6 In this sense,
this model is a generalization of the Bucci (2003) and the Arnold (1998) models.7 Un-
der perfect competition in the final output market and the factor inputs markets, the
representative firm chooses intermediate goods and skilled labor in order to maximize its
profit taking prices as given and subject to its technological constraint. The first order
conditions are the followings :
∂piY
∂xj
= αAH1−αY n
γ−1+αxα−1j − pj = 0, (2)
∂piY
∂HY
= (1− α)AH−αY nγ−1+α − wY = 0, (3)
where wY is the wage rate in the final good sector and pj is the price of the jth intermediate
good. Equation (2) is the inverse demand function for the firm that produces the jth
intermediate good whereas equation (3) characterizes the demand function of skilled labor.
2.2 The intermediate goods sector
In the intermediate goods sector, producers engage in monopolistic competition. Each firm
produces one horizontally differentiated intermediate good and have to buy a patented
design before producing it. Following Grossman and Helpman (1991), Bucci (2003), Bucci
(2005b) and Bucci (2005c), we assume that each local intermediate monopolist has access
to the same technology employing only skilled labor hj :
xj = Bhj. (4)
Using the first order condition, we obtain the price of the jth intermediate good :
pj =
wj
Bα
, (5)
where wj is wage rate in the intermediate goods. At the symmetric equilibrium, all the
firms produce the same quantity of the intermediate good, face the same wage rate and
by consequence fix the same price for their production. The price is equal to a constant
mark up 1
α
over the marginal cost w
B
. Defining by Hj =
∫ n
0
hjdj, the total amount of labor
employed in the intermediate goods sector, we can rewrite the equation (4) :
xj =
BHj
n
, (6)
Finally, the profit function of the firm8 which produces the jth intermediate good is
pij = Aα(1− α)Bαnγ−1Hαj H1−αY . (7)
6Benassy (1996) made a simple modification of the Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) model which clearly
disentangles taste for variety and market power. At the same time, Benassy (1998) and de Groot and
Nahuis (1998) show that the introduction of this modification in an endogenous growth model with
expanding product variety a` la Grossman and Helpman (1991) affects the welfare analysis.
7Indeed, we obtain the Bucci (2003) model by introducing the following constraint γ = 1 − α in our
model. In the same way, we obtain the Arnold (1998) model by introducing the following constraints
γ = 1α − 1 and A = 1 in our model.
8In order to have a negative relationship between competition and profit, we assume that 0 < γ < 1.
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2.3 The R&D sector
There are competitive research firms undertaking R&D. Following Dinopoulos and Thomp-
son (1999), we assume that new blueprints are produced using old blueprint n, an amount
of R&D skilled labor Hn and the skilled labor force H :
n˙ =
nCHn
H
, (8)
where C is a productivity parameter. Unlike Bucci (2003), we explicitly assume that
positive spillover effect is attached to the available stock of disembodied knowledge (ap-
proximated by the existing number of designs, n) in discovering a new product variety.
Another and more important difference is the existence of a dilution effect9 in our model.
Indeed, the equation (8) captures in a very simple way the idea that R&D difficulty grows
with the labor force.10 According to this effect, the invention of a new intermediate re-
quires a share of R&D skilled labor in the skilled labor force Hn =
H
Cn
, which changes over
time because of both innovation and skilled labor growth. While innovation generates a
positive inter-temporal externality, the skilled labor growth tends to reduce innovation
via a fall in the R&D productivity. Because of the perfect competition in the R&D sector,
we can obtain the real wage by using the zero profit condition :
wnHn = n˙Vn, (9)
where wn represents the real wage earned by R&D skilled labor and Vn is the real value
of such a blueprint which is equal to :
Vn =
∫ ∞
t
pije
−r(τ−t)dτ, τ > t, (10)
since the research sector is competitive, the price of the jth design at time t will be equal
to the discounted value of the flow of instantaneous profits that is possible to make in
the intermediate goods sector by the jth firm from t onwards. Given Vn, the free entry
condition leads to :
wn =
nVn
H
, (11)
2.4 The consumer behavior
The demand side is characterized by the representative household who holds asset in the
form of ownership claims on firm and chooses plans for consumption (c), asset holdings
(a) and human capital (h).11 Following Lucas (1988), we assume that the household is
endowed with one unit of time and optimally allocates a fraction u of this time endowment
to productive activities (final good, intermediate goods and research production) and the
remaining fraction (1 − u) to non productive activities (education). Following Romer
(1990), we assume that the utility function of this consumer is 12 :
U =
∫ ∞
0
e−ρtlog(c)dt, (12)
9Dinopoulos and Segestrom (1999) have introduced this kind of effect in an endogenous growth model.
In our model, contrary to the Dinopoulos and Segestrom (1999) model, this effect is also linked to the
human capital accumulation.
10For more details about this issue, see Dinopoulos and Thompson (1999), Dinopoulos and Sener (2006)
and Jones (2005).
11Like Bucci (2003), Bucci (2005b) and Bucci (2005c), for the sake of simplicity, we assume that there
is no population growth.
12This specification of the utility function does not alter our results.
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where c is private consumption, ρ > 0 is the rate of pure time preference. The flow budget
constraint for the household is :
a˙ = wuh+ ra− c, (13)
where w is the wage rate per unit of skilled labor services. The human capital supply
function is given by :
h˙ = δ(1− u)h, (14)
where δ > 0 is a parameter reflecting the productivity of the education technology. From
the maximization program of the consumer,13 the first order conditions are :
λ1 =
1
c
e−ρt, (15)
−λ˙1 = λ1r, (16)
−λ˙2 = λ1wu+ λ2δ(1− u), (17)
λ1 = λ2
δ
w
. (18)
Equation (15) gives the discounted marginal utility of consumption which satisfies the
dynamic optimality condition in equation (16). Equation (18) gives the static optimality
condition for the allocation of time. The marginal cost of an additional unit of skills
devoted to working evolves optimally as in equation (17). Conditions (15) through (18)
must satisfy the constraints (13) and (14), together with the transversality conditions :
lim
t→∞
λ1tat = 0, (19)
lim
t→∞
λ2tht = 0. (20)
3 The equilibrium and the steady state
In this section, we characterize the equilibrium and give some analytical characterization
of a balanced growth path.
3.1 The equilibrium
It is now possible to characterize the skilled labor market equilibrium in the economy
considered. On this market, because of the homogeneity and the perfect mobility across
sectors, the arbitrage ensures that the wage rate that is earned by employees who work
in the final good sector, intermediate goods sector or R&D sector is equal. As a result,
the following three conditions must simultaneously be checked :
u∗ = sY + sj + sn, (21)
wj = wY , (22)
wj = wn. (23)
Equation (21) is a resource constraint, saying that at any point in the time the sum of
the skilled labor demands coming from each activity must be equal to the total available
13The control variables of this problem are c and u whereas a and h are the state variables. λ1 and λ2
denote the shadow price of the household’s asset holdings and human capital stock.
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supply. Equation (22) and equation (23) state that the wage earned by one unit of skilled
labor is to be the same irrespective of the sector where that unit of skilled labor is actually
employed.
We can characterize the product market equilibrium in the economy considered. Indeed,
on this market, the firms produce a final good that can be consumed. Consequently, the
following condition must be checked :
Y = C. (24)
Equation (24) is a resource constraint on the final good sector.
We can describe the capital market equilibrium in our economy. Because the total value
of the household’s assets must be equal to the total value of firms, the following condition
must be checked :
a = nVn, (25)
where Vn is given by the equation (10) and satisfies the following asset pricing equation :
V˙n = rVn − pij, (26)
3.2 The steady state
At the steady state, all variables as Y , c, n, a, H,14 HY , Hj, Hn grow at a positive
constant rate.
Proposition 1 If u is constant then all the other variables grow at strictly positive rate
gh = gH = gHY = gHj = gHn , (27)
gY = gc = ga = γgn + gh, (28)
gn = Csn (29)
Proof. From the equilibrium on the skilled labor market, given by the equation (21), it
easy to show that gH = gHY = gHj = gHn if u is constant. Because of the assumption
on the size of the representative household and the population growth rate, it is obviously
that gh = gH . Combining these two conditions, we get gh = gH = gHY = gHj = gHn.
From the definition of the firm research process, given by the equation (8), we obtain that
gn = Csn. From the equilibrium on the product market, given by the equation (24), it is
easy to find that gY = gc. The equations (7, 10, 25, 26) implies that ga = γgn + gh. By
substituting equation (6) into equation (1), then by log-differentiating the equation (1), we
obtain gY = γgn+ gh. By combining the previous equations, we find the equation (28).
14Given the assumptions on the size of the representative household and the population growth rate,
h ≡ H which implies that we can use gH instead of gh.
6
Using the previous equations, we can demonstrate the following steady state equilib-
rium values for the relevant variables of the model15 :
r = δ − γ(δ + (α− 1)(C + δ)α)ρ
δ
, (30)
Hj =
Hα(C + δ)αρ
Cδ
, (31)
HY =
H(C + δ)(1− α)ρ
Cδ
, (32)
Hn =
H((1− α)(C + δ)α + δ)ρ
Cδ
, (33)
u∗ =
ρ
δ
, (34)
gh = gH = δ − ρ, (35)
gn =
(1− α)(C + δ)α + δ)ρ
δ
, (36)
gY = gc = δ − ρ− γ(δ + α(α− 1)(C + δ))ρ
δ
. (37)
According to the equation (30), the real interest rate (r) is constant. Equation (31), (32)
and (33) give the amount of skilled labor in each sector at the equilibrium. Equation (34)
represents the optimal and constant fraction of the household’s time endowment that
it will decide to devote to work (u∗) at the equilibrium. Equation (35) states that the
growth rate of human capital depends on technological and preference parameters (δ and
ρ).16 Unlike the Lucas (1988), Blackburn, Hung, and Pozzolo (2000) and Bucci (2003)
papers, the equation (36) show that the growth rate of the innovative activity depends
not only on preference and technological parameters but also on competition. Unlike
the Lucas (1988), Blackburn, Hung, and Pozzolo (2000)17 and Bucci (2003)18 papers, the
equation (37) shows that the growth rate depends not only on the competition (α) and
human capital accumulation (gh) but also on the degree of returns from specialization (γ)
and a productivity parameter (C). As in the recent Lucas (1988), Blackburn, Hung, and
Pozzolo (2000) and Bucci (2003) papers, the market power enjoyed in the monopolistic
sector does not play any role on the consumers’ decision about how much time to invest in
education and training (such a decision being solely driven by the parameters describing
preferences and human capital technology).
4 The relationship between product market compe-
tition and growth
In this section, we study the long run relationship between competition and growth in the
model presented above. Following most authors (Bucci (2003), Aghion, Bloom, Blundell,
Griffith, and Howitt (2005), Aghion and Griffith (2005), Aghion and Howitt (2005), Bucci
(2005a), Bucci (2005b), Bucci (2005c), Bianco (2006) and Bianco (2007)), we use the so-
called Lerner Index to gauge the intensity of market power within a market. Such an
15Results (30) through (37) are demonstrated in the appendix.
16The condition δ > ρ also assures that 0 < u∗ < 1.
17In these models, output growth depends only on human capital accumulation (gh).
18In this model, output growth depends not only on human capital accumulation (gh) but also on
competition (α).
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index is defined by the ratio of price (P ) minus marginal cost (Cm) over price. Using the
definition of a mark up (Markup= P
Cm
) and Lerner Index (LernerIndex=P−Cm
P
), we can
use (5) to define a proxy of competition as follows :
(1− LernerIndex) = α, (38)
We show that in this model which consists in having the monopolistic mark-up in
the intermediate goods sector and the returns to specialization treated separately, the
relationship between competition and growth is inverse U shaped. This theoretical result
is in line with the empirical results (Aghion and Griffith (2005)).
Proposition 2 The relationship between competition and growth is inverse U shaped.
Proof. The proof is obtained by differentiating (37) with respect to α :
∂gY
∂α
= −(2α− 1)γ(C + δ)ρ
δ
, (39)
AsC, δ, ρ > 0 and 0 < γ < 1, then we the sign of the derivative is given by the opposite
sign of 2α − 1. Finally, we obtain that ∂gY
∂α
> 0 if and only if 0 ≤ α < 1
2
and ∂gY
∂α
< 0 if
and only if 1
2
< α ≤ 1.
To enlighten Proposition 2, remark that any increase in competition has a non linear
effect on the skilled labor allocated to the research sector (Hn). This means that the
resource allocation effect seems to predict an inverted-U relationship between product
market competition and growth. Moreover, the human capital accumulation which is the
second source of growth in our model, has a positive and linear effect on growth. Finally,
the relationship between product market competition and growth is inverse U shaped.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we presented a generalization of the Bucci (2003) model in which we dis-
entangle the monopolistic mark-up in the intermediate goods sector and the returns to
specialization in order to have a better measure of competition. Indeed, in our model
the market power parameter is not strongly related to the returns to specialization but it
is completely independent. Moreover, we introduce the degree of R&D difficulty in the
sense that higher values of skilled labor force require more skilled labor allocated in the
research sector to achieve the same level of the growth rate of knowledge.
The results of the model can be summarized as follows. First of all, the steady-state
output growth rate depends on the parameters describing preferences, human capital
accumulation technology and R&D activity. Secondly, we find that the relationship be-
tween competition and growth is inverse U shaped. This result that seems to be in line
this empirical results (Aghion and Griffith (2005)) is explained by the resource allocation
effect.
Appendix
In this appendix, we describe the way followed in order to obtain the main results of this
paper (30 through 37). Consider the representative consumer’s problem (equations (12)
8
through (21) in the main text), whose the first order conditions are stated in equations
(15) through (21) with consumer’s constraints and transversality conditions, we have :
λ1 =
1
c
e−ρt, (40)
−λ˙1 = λ1r, (41)
−λ˙2 = λ1wu+ λ2δ(1− u), (42)
λ1 = λ2
δ
w
. (43)
a˙ = ra+ wuh− c, (44)
h˙ = δ(1− u)h, (45)
lim
t→∞
λ1tat = 0, (46)
lim
t→∞
λ2tht = 0. (47)
Combining equations (43) and (42), we obtain :
λ˙2
λ2
= −δ. (48)
From equation (41), we get :
λ˙1
λ1
= −r. (49)
Equation (43) implies that :
λ˙1
λ1
=
λ˙2
λ2
− gw. (50)
Combining equations (48), (49) and (50), we obtain :
r = δ + gw. (51)
In the balanced growth path equilibrium, the growth rate of the wage accruing to human
capital (gw) is constant (see later on this appendix). This implies that the real interest
rate (r) will be also constant. With a constant real interest rate and using the equation
(7), the equation (10) becomes :
Vnt = Aα(1− α)Bα
∫ ∞
t
nγ−1τ H
α
jτH
1−α
Y τ e
−r(τ−t)dτ, τ > t (52)
In order to compute the market value of one unit of research output at time t (Vnt) along
the balanced growth path equilibrium, we use the following equations :
nτ = nte
gnt, (53)
Hjτ = Hjte
gHj t, (54)
HY τ = HY te
gHY t. (55)
(56)
Inserting equations (53), (54) and (55) into equation (52), and after some calculations,
we get :
Vnt =
Aα(1− α)Bαnγ−1Hαj H1−αY
r − (γ − 1)gn − (1− α)gHY − αgHj
. (57)
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Such result is obtained under the assumption that r > (γ − 1)gn− (1−α)gHY −αgHj . In
a moment, we will demonstrate that this hypothesis (which assures that Vnt is positive
for each t) is always checked along the balanced growth path equilibrium. Given Vnt and
making use of equation (11) in the main text, we get :
wn =
CAα(1− α)BαnγHαj H1−αY
H(r − (γ − 1)gn − (1− α)gHY − αgHj)
. (58)
From equations (3) and (6), we get the value of the wage rate accruing to human capital
employed in the final good sector :
wY = (1− α)AH−αY nγBαHαj . (59)
From equations (2), (5) and (6), we get the value of the wage rate accruing to human
capital in the intermediate goods sector :
wj = α
2AH1−αY n
γHα−1j . (60)
Equations (58), (59) and (60) together also imply that :
gwn = gwj = gwY = gw = γgn. (61)
Combining equations (51) and (61), we obtain :
r = γgn + δ. (62)
Using equation (23), (58), (60) and (62), we get :
Hj =
Hα(Csn + δ − gh
C(1− α) . (63)
Combining equations (21), (58), (59) and (62), we have :
HY =
H(CSn + δ − gh)(α− 1)
C(α− 1)α . (64)
Combining equations (40), (41) and (62), we are able to obtain the usual Euler equation,
giving the optimal household’s consumption path :
gc = γgn + δ − ρ. (65)
From the equation above, we clearly see that r must be greater than ρ in order to have
gc positive. From equation (25) and using equation (57), we get :
ga = gn + gVn = gn + (γ − 1)gn + αgHj + (1− α)gHY . (66)
Using equations (27), we can rewrite the equation (66) as follows :
ga = γgn + gh. (67)
From equations (44) and (49), we have :
λ˙1
λ1
= −ga + uwh
a
− c
a
. (68)
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Using equations (45) and (48), we get :
λ˙2
λ2
= −gh − uδ. (69)
From equations (61), (67) (68) and (69), we obtain :
c
a
= δu+ uw
h
a
. (70)
Using equation (66) and equation (61) and knowing that u is constant at the equilibrium,
equation (70) leads to the conclusion that c
a
is constant. In other words :
gc = ga = γgn + gh. (71)
Combining equations (65) and (71), we get the growth rate of human capital accumulation
:
gh = δ − ρ. (72)
Combining equation (72) and (14), we get the optimal time of educating :
u =
ρ
δ
. (73)
Using equations (8), (64) and (72), we obtain :
HY =
H(α− 1)(Csn + ρ)
C(α− 1)α . (74)
As sY =
HY
H
, we get :
sY =
(α− 1)(Csn + ρ)
C(α− 1)α . (75)
Using equations (8), (63) and (72), we obtain :
Hj =
Hα(Csn + ρ)
C − Cα . (76)
As sj =
Hj
H
, we get :
sj =
α(Csn + ρ)
C − Cα . (77)
Now, using the skilled labor market equilibrium (equation 21), we get :
sn =
((1− α)(C + δ)α− δ)ρ
Cδ
. (78)
As sn =
Hn
H
, we get the skilled labor allocated in the research sector :
Hn =
H((1− α)(C + δ)α− δ)ρ
Cδ
. (79)
Combining equation (74) and (78), we get the skilled labor allocated in the final good
sector :
HY =
H(C + δ)(1− α)ρ
Cδ
. (80)
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Combining equation (77) and (78), we get the skilled labor allocated in the intermediate
goods sector :
Hj =
Hα(C + δ)αρ
Cδ
. (81)
Given sn, it is now possible to compute the growth rate of knowledge accumulation real
interest by using equation (29) :
gn =
(1− α)(C + δ)α+ δ)ρ
δ
. (82)
Given gn, it is now possible to compute the real interest by using equation (62) :
r = δ − γ(δ + (α− 1)(C + δ)α)ρ
δ
. (83)
Combining equations (28), (71), (72) and (82), we get the growth rate :
gY = δ − ρ− γ(δ + α(α− 1)(C + δ))ρ
δ
. (84)
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